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ABSTRACT
Over the past few years, online aggression and abusive behaviors
have occurred in many different forms and on a variety of plat-
forms. In extreme cases, these incidents have evolved into hate,
discrimination, and bullying, and even materialized into real-world
threats and attacks against individuals or groups. In this paper, we
study the Gamergate controversy. Started in August 2014 in the
online gaming world, it quickly spread across various social net-
working platforms, ultimately leading to many incidents of cyber-
bullying and cyberaggression. We focus on Twitter, presenting a
measurement study of a dataset of 340k unique users and 1.6M
tweets to study the properties of these users, the content they post,
and how they differ from random Twitter users. We find that users
involved in this “Twitter war” tend to have more friends and fol-
lowers, are generally more engaged and post tweets with negative
sentiment, less joy, and more hate than random users. We also
perform preliminary measurements on how the Twitter suspension
mechanism deals with such abusive behaviors. While we focus on
Gamergate, our methodology to collect and analyze tweets related
to aggressive and bullying activities is of independent interest.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of social networking services and always-
on always-connected devices, social interactions have increasingly
moved online, as social media has become an integral part of peo-
ple’s every day life. At the same time, however, new instanti-
ations of negative interactions have arisen, including aggressive
and bullying behavior among online users. Cyberbullying, the
digital manifestation of bullying and aggressiveness in online so-
cial interactions, has spread to various platforms such as Twit-
ter [23], Youtube [6], Ask.fm [14, 15], and Facebook [27]. Other
community-based services such as Yahoo Answers [16], and online
gaming platforms are not an exception [18]. Research has showed
that bullying actions are often organized, with online users called to
participate in hateful raids against other social network users [13].
The Gamergate controversy [17] is one example of a coordi-
nated campaign of harassment in the online world. It started with
a blog post by an ex-boyfriend of independent game developer Zoe
Quinn, alleging sexual improprieties. 4chan boards like /r9k/ [1]
and /pol/ [2], turned it into a narrative about “ethical” concerns
in video game journalism and began organizing harassment cam-
paigns [13]. It quickly devolved into a polarizing issue, involving
sexism, feminism, and “social justice,” taking place on social me-
dia like Twitter [11]. Although held up as a pseudo-political move-
ment by its adherents, there is substantial evidence that Gamergate
is more accurately described as an organized campaign of hate and
harassment [12]. What started as “mere” denigration of women
in the gaming industry, eventually evolved into directed threats of
violence, rape, and murder [29]. Gamergate came about due to a
unique time in the digital world in general, and gaming in partic-
ular. The recent democratization of video game development and
distribution via platforms such as Steam has allowed for a new gen-
eration of “indie” game developers who often have a more intimate
relationship with their games and the community of gamers that
play them. With the advent of ubiquitous social media and a com-
munity born in the digital world, the Gamergate controversy pro-
vides us a unique point of view into online harassment campaigns.
Roadmap. In this paper, we explore a slice of the Gamergate con-
troversy by analyizing 1.6M tweets from 340k unique users part of
whom engaged in it. As a first attempt at quantifying this contro-
versy, we focus on how these users, and the content they post, differ
from random (baseline) Twitter users. We discover that Gamer-
gaters are seemingly more engaged than random Twitter users,
which is an indication as to how and why this controversy is still
on going. We also find that, while their tweets appear to be aggres-
sive and hateful, Gamergaters do not exhibit common expressions
of online anger, and in fact primarily differ from random users in
that their tweets are less joyful. The increased rate of engagement
of Gamergate users makes it more difficult for Twitter to deal with
all these cases at once, something reflected in the relative low sus-
pension rates of such users. In the struggle to combat existing ag-
gressive and bullying behaviors, Twitter recently took new actions
and is now temporarily limiting users for abusive behavior [25].
Finally, we note that, although our work is focused on Gamergate
in particular, our principled methodology to collect and analyze
tweets related to aggressive and bullying activities on Twitter can
be generalized and it is thus of independent interest.
Paper Organization. Next section reviews related work, then Sec-
tion 3 discusses our data collection methodology. In Section 4, we
present the results of our analysis and lessons we learn from them.
Finally, the paper concludes in Section 5.
2. RELATEDWORK
Previous research has studied and aimed at detecting offensive,
abusive, aggressive, and bullying content on social media, includ-
ing Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook and Ask.fm. Next, we
cover related work on this type of behavior in general, as well as
work related to the Gamergate case.
Detecting abusive behavior. Chen et al. [6] aim to detect offensive
content and potential offensive users by analyzing YouTube com-
ments. Then, Hosseinmardi et al. [14, 15] turn to cyberbullying on
Instagram and Ask.fm. Specifically, in [15], besides considering
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available text information, they also try to associate the topic of an
image (e.g., drugs, celebrity, sports, etc.) to possible cyberbullying
events, concluding that drugs are highly associated with cyberbul-
lying. Also, in a effort to create a suitable dataset for their analy-
sis, at first the authors collected a large number of media sessions
– i.e., videos and images along with comments – from Instagram
public profiles, with a subset selected for labeling. To ensure that
an adequate number of cyberbullying instances will be present in
the dataset, they selected media sessions with at least one profan-
ity word. Finally, they relied on the CrowdFlower crowdsourcing
platform to determine whether or not such sessions are related with
cyberbullying or cyberaggression. In [14] authors leveraged both
likes and comments to identify negative behavior in the Ask.fm so-
cial network. Here, their dataset was created by exploiting publicly
accessible profiles, e.g. questions, answers, and likes.
Other works aim to detect hate/abusive content on Yahoo Fi-
nance. In [8], the authors use a Yahoo Finance dataset labeled over
a 6-month period. Nobata et al. [20] gather a new dataset from
Yahoo Finance and News comments: each comment is initially
characterized as either abusive or clean (from Yahoo’s in-house
trained raters), with further analysis on the abusive comments spec-
ifying whether they contain hate, derogative language, or profanity.
They follow two annotation processes, with labeling performed by:
(i) three trained raters, and (ii) workers recruited from Amazon Me-
chanical Turk, concluding that the former is more effective.
Kayes et al. [16] focus on a Community-based Question-
Answering (CQA) site, Yahoo Answers, finding that users tend
to flag abusive content posted in an overwhelmingly correct way,
while in [7], the problem of cyberbullying is further decomposed
to sensitive topics related to race and culture, sexuality, and in-
telligence, using YouTube comments extracted from controver-
sial videos. Hee et al. [27] also study specific types of cyber-
bullying, e.g., threats and insults, on Dutch posts extracted from
Ask.fm social media. They also highlight three main user behav-
iors, harasser, victim, and bystander – either bystander-defender or
bystander-assistant who support the victim or the harasser, respec-
tively. Their dataset was created by crawling a number of seed sites
from Ask.fm, with a limited number of cyberbullying instances.
They complement the data with more cyberbullying related content
by: (i) launching a campaign where people reported personal cases
of cyberbullying taking place in different platforms, i.e., Facebook,
message board posts and chats, and (ii) by designing a role-playing
game involving a cyberbullying simulation on Facebook. Then,
they ask manual annotators to characterize content as being part of
a cyberbullying event, and indicate the author’s role in such event,
i.e., victim, harasser, bystander-defender, or bystander-assistant.
Sanchez et al. [23] use Twitter messages to detect bullying in-
stances and more specifically cases related to gender bullying.
They use a distant supervision approach [10] to automatically label
a set of tweets by using a set of abusive terms used to character-
ize text as expressing negative or positive sentiment. The dataset is
then used to train a classifier geared to finding inappropriate words
in Twitter text and detect bullying – the hypothesis being that bul-
lying instances most probably contain negative sentiment. Finally,
in [3] the authors propose an approach suitable for detecting bul-
lying and aggressive behavior on Twitter. They study the prop-
erties of cuberbullies and aggressors and what distinguishes them
from regular users. To perform their analysis, they build upon the
CrowdFlower crowdsourcing tool to create a dataset where users
are characterized as bullies, aggressors, spammers, or normal.
Even though Twitter is among the most popular social networks,
only a few efforts have focused on detecting abusive content on it.
Here, we propose an approach for building a ground truth dataset,
using Twitter as a source of information, which will contain a
higher density of abusive content (mimicking real life abusive post-
ing activity).
Analysis of Gamergate. In our work, the hashtag #GamerGate
serves as a seed word to build a dataset of abusive behavior, as
Gamergate is one of the best documented large-scale instances of
bullying/aggressive behavior we are aware of [17]. With individ-
uals on both sides of the controversy using it, and extreme cases
of cyberbullying and aggressive behavior associated with it (e.g.,
direct threats of rape and murder), #GamerGate is a relatively un-
ambiguous hashtag associated with tweets that are likely to involve
abusive/aggressive behavior. Prior work has also looked at Gamer-
gate in somewhat related contexts. For instance, Guberman and
Hemphill [11] used #GamerGate to collect a sufficient number of
harassment-related tweets in an effort to study and detect toxic-
ity on Twitter. Also, Mortensen [18] likens the Gamergate phe-
nomenon to hooliganism, i.e., a leisure-centered aggression where
fans are organized in groups to attack another group’s members.
3. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present our methodology for collecting and
processing a dataset of abusive behavior on Twitter. In this paper,
we focus on the Gamergate case, however, our methodology can be
generalized to other platforms and case studies.
3.1 Data Collection
Seed keyword(s). The first step is to select one or more seed key-
words, which are likely related to the occurrence of abusive inci-
dents. Besides #GamerGate, good examples are also #BlackLives-
Matter and #PizzaGate. In addition to such seed words, a set of
hate- or curse-related words can also be used, e.g., words extracted
from the Hatebase database (HB)1, to start collecting possible abu-
sive texts from social media sources. Therefore, at time t1, the list
of words to be used for filtering posted texts includes only the seed
word(s), i.e., L(t1) =< seed(s) >.
In our case, we focus on Twitter, and more specifically we build
upon the Twitter Streaming API2 which gives access to 1% of all
tweets. This returns a set of correlated information, either user-
based, e.g., poster’s username, followers and friends count, profile
image, total number of posted/liked/favorite tweets, or text-based,
e.g., the text itself, hashtags, URLs, if it is a retweeted or reply
tweet, etc. The data collection process took place from June to
August 2016. Initially, we obtained a 1% of the sample public
tweets and parsed it to select all tweets containing the seed word
#GamerGate, which are likely to involve the type of behavior, and
the case study we are interested in.
Dynamic list of keywords. In addition to the seed keyword(s),
further filtering keywords are used to select abusive-related con-
tent. The list of the additional keywords is updated dynamically in
consecutive time intervals based on the posted texts during these
intervals. Thus, in T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} the keywords list L(t) has
the following form: L(ti) =< seed(s), kw1, kw2, kwN >, where
kwj is the jth top keyword in time period ∆T = ti − ti−1. De-
pending on the topic under examination, i.e., if it is a popular topic
or not, the creation of the dynamic keywords list can be split to dif-
ferent consecutive time intervals. To maintain the dynamic list of
keywords for the time period ti−1 → ti, we investigate the texts
posted in this time period. We extract N keywords found during
that time, compute their frequency and rank them into a tempo-
rary list LT (ti). We then adjust the dynamic list L(ti) with entries
1 https://www.hatebase.org/
2 https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
2
from the temporary list LT (ti) to create a new dynamic list that
contains the up-to-date top N keywords along with the seed words.
This new list is used in the next time period ti → ti+1 for the
filtering of posted text.
As mentioned, #GamerGate serves as a seed for a snowball sam-
pling of other hashtags likely associated with cyberbullying and
aggressive behavior. We include tweets with hashtags appearing
in the same tweets as #GamerGate (the keywords list is updated
on a daily basis). Overall, we reach 308 hashtags during the data
collection period. A manual examination of these hashtags reveals
that they do contain a number of hate words, e.g., #InternationalOf-
fendAFeministDay, #IStandWithHateSpeech, and #KillAllNiggers.
Random sample. To complement the dataset with cases that are
less likely to contain abusive content, we also crawl a random sam-
ple of texts over the same time period. In our case, we simply crawl
a random set of tweets, which constitutes our baseline.
Remarks. Overall, we have collected two datasets: (i) a random
sample set of 1M tweets, and (ii) a set of 659k tweets which are
likely to contain abusive behavior.
We argue that the our data collection methodology provides sev-
eral benefits with respect to performance. First, it allows for regular
updates of the keyword list, hence, the collection of more up-to-
date content and capturing previously unseen behaviors, keywords,
and trends. Second, it lets us adjust the update time of the dynamic
keywords list based on the observed burstiness of the topics under
examination, thus eliminating the possibility of either losing new
information or collecting repeatedly the same information. Finally,
this process can be parallelized for scalability on multiple machines
using a Map-Reduce script for computing top N keywords list. All
machines maintain local top N keyword lists which are aggregated
globally in a central controller, enabling the construction of a global
dynamic top N keyword list that can be distributed back to the com-
puting / crawling machines.
3.2 Data Processing
We performed preprocessing of the data collected to produce a
‘clean’ dataset, free of noisy data.
Cleaning. We remove stop words, URLs, numbers, and punctua-
tion marks. Additionally, we perform normalization, i.e., we elimi-
nate repeated letters and repetitive characters which users often use
to express their feelings more intensely (e.g., the word ‘hellooo’ is
converted to ‘hello’).
Spam removal. Even though extensive work has been done on
spam detection in social media, e.g., [9, 24, 28], Twitter is still full
of spam accounts [5], often using vulgar language and exhibiting
behavior (repeated posts with similar content, mentions, or hash-
tags) that could also be considered as aggressive or bullying. So,
to eliminate part of this noise we proceeded with a first-level spam
removal process by considering two attributes which have already
been used as filters (e.g., [28]) to remove spam incidents: (i) the
number of hashtags per tweet (often used for boosting the visibility
of the posted tweets), and (ii) posting of (almost) similar tweets. To
find optimal cutoffs for these heuristics, we study both the distribu-
tion of hashtags and the duplication of tweets.
Hashtags. The hashtags distribution shows that users tend to use
from 0 to about 17 hashtags on average. With such information at
hand, we test different cutoffs to set a proper limit, upon which the
user could be characterized as spammer. After a manual inspection
on a sample of posts, we set the limit to 5 hashtags, i.e., users with
more than 5 hashtags, on average, are flagged as spammers, and
their tweets are removed from the dataset.
Figure 1: Similarity distribution.
Duplications. We also estimate the similarity of users’ posts based
on an appropriate similarity measure. In many cases, a user’s tweets
are (almost) the same, while only the listed mentioned users are
modified. So, in addition to the previous presented cleaning pro-
cesses, we also remove all existing mentions. We then proceed to
compute the Levenshtein distance [19], which counts the minimum
number of single-character edits needed to convert one string into
another, averaging it out over all pairs of their tweets. Initially, for
each user, we calculated the intra-tweet similarity, then we set to
out estimate the average intra-tweets similarity. For a user with x
tweets, we use a set of n similarity scores, where n = x(x− 1)/2.
In the end, all users with intra-tweet similarity above 0.8 are ex-
cluded from the dataset. Figure 1 shows that about 5% of the users
have a high percentage of similar posts and which were removed.
4. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our measurement-
based characterization, comparing the baseline and the Gamergate
(GG) related datasets across various dimensions, including user at-
tributes, posting activity, content semantics, and Twitter account
status.
4.1 How Active are Gamergaters?
Account age. An underlying question about the Gamergate contro-
versy is what started first: participants tweeting about it or Twitter
users participating in Gamergate? In other words, did Gamergate
draw people to Twitter, or were Twitter users drawn to Gamer-
gate? In Figure 2a, we plot the distribution of account age for
users in the Gamergate dataset and baseline users. For the most
part, GG users tend to have older accounts (mean = 982.94 days,
median = 788 days, STD = 772.49 days). The mean, me-
dian, and STD values for the random users are 834.39, 522, and
652.42 days, respectively. Based on a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test,3 the two distributions are different with a test statistic
D = 0.20142 and p < 0.01. Overall, the oldest account in our
dataset belongs to a GG user, while only 26.64% of baseline ac-
counts are older than the mean value of the GG users. Figure 2a
indicates that GG users were existing Twitter users drawn to the
controversy. In fact, their familiarity with Twitter could be the rea-
son that Gamergate exploded in the first place.
Tweets and Hashtags. In Figure 2b, we plot the distribution of
the number of tweets made by GG users and random users. GG
users are significantly more active than random Twitter users (D =
0.352, p < 0.01). The mean, median, and STD values for the GG
3A statistical test to compare the probability distributions of differ-
ent samples.
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(a) Account age distribution. (b) Posts distribution. (c) Hashtags distribution.
Figure 2: CDF of (a) Account age, (b) Number of posts, and (c) Hashtags.
(a) Favorites distribution. (b) Lists distribution. (c) URLs distribution. (d) Mentions distribution.
Figure 3: CDF of (a) Number of Favorites, (b) Lists, (c) URLs, (d) Mentions.
(random) users are 135,618 (49,342), 48,587 (9,429), and 185,997
(97,457) posts, resp. Figure 2c reports the CDF of the number
of hashtags found in users’ tweets for both GG and the random
sample, finding that GG users use significantly (D = 0.25681,
p < 0.01) more hashtags than random Twitter users.
Other characteristics. Figures 3a and 3b show the CDFs of fa-
vorites and lists declared in the users’ profiles. We note that in
the median case, GG users are similar to baseline users, but on the
tail end (30% of users), GG users have more favorites and topi-
cal lists declared than random users. Then, Figure 3c reports the
CDF of the number of URLs found in tweets by both baseline and
GG users. The former post fewer URLs (the median indicates a
difference of 1-2 URLs, D = 0.26659, p < 0.01), while the lat-
ter post more in an attempt to disseminate information about their
“cause,” somewhat using Twitter like a news service. Finally, Fig-
ure 3d shows that GG users tend to make more mentions within
their posts, which can be ascribed to the higher number of direct
attacks compared to random users.
Take aways. Overall, the behavior we observe is indicative of GG
users’ “mastery” of Twitter as a mechanism for broadcasting their
ideals. They make use of more advanced features, e.g., lists, tend
to favorite more tweets, and share more URLs and hashtags than
random users. Using hashtags and mentions can draw attention to
their message, thus GG users likely use them to disseminate their
ideas deeper in the Twitter network, possibly aiming to attack more
users and topical groups.
4.2 How Social are Gamergaters?
Gamergaters are involved in what we would typically think of
as anti-social behavior. However, this is somewhat at odds with
the fact that their activity takes place primarily on social media.
Aiming to give an idea of how “social” Gamergaters are, in Fig-
(a) Friends distribution. (b) Followers distribution.
Figure 4: CDF of (a) Number of Friends, (b) Followers.
ures 4a and 4b, we plot the distribution of friends and followers
for GG users vs baseline users. We observe that, perhaps surpris-
ingly, GG users tend to have more friends and followers (D = 0.34
and 0.39, p < 0.01 for both). Although this might be somewhat
counter-intuitive, the reality is that Gamergate was born on social
media, and the controversy appears to be a clear “us vs. them” sit-
uation. This leads to easy identification of in-group membership,
thus heightening the likelihood of relationship formation.
The ease of in-group membership identification is somewhat dif-
ferent than polarizing issues in the real world where it may be diffi-
cult to know a person’s views on a polarizing subject, without actu-
ally engaging them on the subject. In fact, people in real life might
be unwilling to express their viewpoint because of social conse-
quences. On the contrary, on social media platforms like Twitter,
(pseudo-)anonymity often removes much of the inhibition people
feel in the real world, and public timelines can often provide per-
sistent and explicit expression of viewpoints.
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(a) Emoticons distribution. (b) Uppercases distribution. (c) Sentiment distribution. (d) Joy distribution.
Figure 5: CDF of (a) Emoticons, (b) Uppercases, (c) Sentiment, (d) Joy.
4.3 How Different is Gamergater’s Content?
Emoticons and Uppercase Tweets. Two common ways to express
emotion in social media are emoticons and “shouting” by using all
capital letters. Based on the nature of Gamergate, we would expect
a relatively low number of emoticon usage, but many tweets that
would be shouting in all uppercase letters. However, as we can
see in Figures 5a and 5b, which plot the CDF of emoticon usage
and all uppercase tweets, respectively, this is not the case. GG
and random users tend to use emoticons at about the same rate (we
are unable to reject the null hypothesis with D = 0.028 and p =
0.96). However, GG users tend to use all uppercase less often (D =
0.212, p < 0.01). As mentioned, GG users are savvy Twitter users,
and generally speaking, shouting tends to be ignored. Thus, one
explanation for this behavior is that GG users avoid such a simple
“tell” as posting in all uppercase, to ensure their message is not so
easily dismissed.
Sentiment. In Figure 5c, we plot the CDF of sentiment of tweets.
In both cases (GG and baseline) around 25% of tweets are posi-
tive. However, GG users post tweets with a generally more nega-
tive sentiment (D = 0.101, p < 0.01). In particular, around 25%
of GG tweets are negative compared to only around 15% for base-
line users. This observation aligns with the fact that the GG dataset
contains a large proportion of offensive posts.
We also compare the offensiveness score of tweets according to
Hatebase, a crowdsourced list of hate words. Each word included in
HB is scored on a [0, 100] scale, which indicates how hateful it is.
Though the difference is slight, GG users use more hate words than
random users (D = 0.006, p < 0.01). The mean and standard
deviation values for HB score are 0.06 and 2.16 for the baseline
users, while for the GG users they are 0.25 and 3.55, respectively.
Finally, based on [4], we extract sentiment values for 6 differ-
ent emotions: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise. We
note that of these, the 2-sample KS test is unable to reject the null
hypothesis except for joy, as shown in Figure 5d (D = 0.089,
p < 0.01). This is particularly interesting because it contradicts
the narrative that Gamergaters are posting virulent content out of
anger. Instead, GG users are less joyful, and this is a subtle but
important difference: they are not necessarily angry, but they are
apparently not happy.
4.4 AreGamergaters SuspendedMoreOften?
A Twitter user can be in one of the following three statuses: ac-
tive, deleted, or suspended. Typically, Twitter suspends an account
(temporarily or even permanently, in some cases) if it has been hi-
jacked/compromised, is considered spam/fake, or if it is abusive.4
4 https://support.twitter.com/articles/15790
active deleted suspended
Baseline 67% 13% 20%
Gamergate 86% 5% 9%
Table 1: Status distribution.
A user account is deleted if the user-owner of the account deacti-
vates their account. In the following, we examine the differences
among these three statuses with respect to GG and baseline users.
To examine these differences, we focus on a sample of 33k users
from both the GG and baseline datasets. From Table 1, we ob-
serve that, in both cases, users tend to be suspended more often
than deleting their accounts by choice. However, baseline users are
more prone to be suspended (20%) or delete their accounts (13%)
than GG users (9% and 5%, respectively). This seems to be in
line with the behavior observed in Figure 2a, which shows that GG
users have been in the platform for a longer period of time; some-
what surprising given their exhibited behavior. Indeed, a small por-
tion of these users may be spammers who are difficult to detect
and filter out. Nevertheless, Twitter has made significant efforts to
address spam and we suspect there is a higher presence of such ac-
counts in the baseline dataset, since the GG dataset is very much
focused around a somewhat niche topic.
These efforts are less apparent when it comes to the bullying
and aggressive behavior phenomena observed on Twitter in gen-
eral [22, 26], and in our study of Gamergate users in particular.
However, recently, Twitter has increased its efforts to combat the
existing harassment cases, for instance, by preventing suspended
users from creating new accounts [21], or temporarily limiting
users for abusive behavior [25]. Such efforts constitute initial steps
to deal with the ongoing war among the abusers, their victims, and
online bystanders.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a first-of-its-kind effort to quantitatively an-
alyze the Gamergate controversy. We collected 1.6M tweets from
340k unique users using a generic methodology (which can also be
used for other platforms and other case studies). Although focused
on a narrow slice of time, we found that, in general, users tweeting
about Gamergate appear to be Twitter savvy and quite engaged with
the platform. They produce more tweets than random users, and
have more friends and followers as well. Surprisingly, we observed
that, while expressing more negative sentiment overall, these users
only differed significantly from random users with respect to joy.
Finally, we looked at account suspension, finding that Gamergate
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users are less likely to be suspended due to the inherent difficulties
in detecting and combating online harassment activities.
While we believe our work contributes to understanding large-
scale online harassment, it is only a start. As part of future work,
we plan to perform a more in-depth study of Gamergate, focusing
on how it evolved over time. Overall, we argue that a deeper under-
standing of how online harassment campaigns function can enable
our community to better address them and propose detection tools
as well as mitigation strategies.
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